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INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to the Court’s Order of November 20, 2018, amici curiae the American
Civil Liberties Union and ACLU of Utah submit this brief to explain why the Court can
and should issue a rule permitting undocumented immigrants to be admitted as members
of the Utah State Bar.
The Utah Constitution empowers this Court to regulate the practice of law in Utah,
including bar admission. It also prohibits any other branch of Utah government from
regulating the practice of law, both to ensure judicial independence and to protect the
integrity of judicial proceedings. This Court is therefore the sole entity that exercises the
State’s lawmaking authority over bar admission.
Federal law allows this Court to exercise its authority in this case. Federal law
sets a default rule that undocumented immigrants are ineligible for state “public
benefit[s],” which includes some “professional license[s].” 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), (c). But
even assuming a law license qualifies as a “public benefit” under § 1621(c), a “State” can
make undocumented immigrants eligible for public benefits “through the enactment of a
State law” that “affirmatively provides for such eligibility.” Id. § 1621(d). Section
1621(d) thus allows the State of Utah to enact a law making undocumented immigrants
eligible for bar admission. And this Court is the entity—the only entity—that makes
such laws in Utah.
Nothing in § 1621(d) compels a different result. The United States may argue that
§ 1621(d) requires States to exercise their lawmaking authority through their legislatures
only—that a state statute is required to opt out of the prohibition in § 1621(a). But
1

§ 1621(d) does not purport to dictate which branch of state government must make this
decision. The text describes the process for providing eligibility using the most general
terms possible—“enact[]” and “law”—without specifying who must do the enacting, or
what form the law must take. As multiple dictionaries, judicial usage, and congressional
usage attest, those terms refer to legal rules of all kinds, not just statutes, and to
lawmaking entities of all kinds, not just legislatures. Indeed, when Congress wants to
specify a particular state actor or type of state law, it regularly makes explicit reference to
“statutes,” “legislation,” “state legislatures,” and the like.

By omitting those more

specific words in § 1621(d), and instead using general terms, Congress left it to the States
to determine which branch of state government regulates which activities. That makes
sense, because Congress has no valid interest in how States choose to structure their
governments, including which branch regulates public benefits.
A contrary interpretation—that only the Utah Legislature can enact a law
providing public benefits—would mark a severe federal intrusion on the internal structure
of Utah’s government. The only effect of such a rule would be to dictate which branch of
Utah’s government exercises the State’s lawmaking authority. The State would retain its
authority to admit undocumented immigrants to the bar. But by requiring action by the
Utah Legislature, this interpretation of § 1621(d) would override Utah’s decision to
assign bar admission decisions to the Court, thus forcing the State to distribute its own
lawmaking authority according to federal instructions.
At the very least, that kind of intrusion would require an “unmistakably clear”
statement in the text of § 1621(d)—a statement that is lacking here. Gregory v. Ashcroft,
2

501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quotation marks omitted). The best reading of § 1621(d)’s
text is that the statute is agnostic about which branch of state government provides
eligibility for public benefits.

But even assuming the text were ambiguous, the

federalism clear-statement rule would require the Court to choose the less intrusive
interpretation, the one that preserves the State’s internal allocation of its own authority.
Nor is there anything in § 1621’s purpose that explains why Congress would have
preferred one kind of state law over another. The statute was enacted to regulate public
benefits, not the balance of power within state governments.
Constitutional avoidance requires the same result. A legislature-only rule would
contravene the Constitution’s federal structure, which empowers Congress to regulate
private actors directly, but not to issue orders to state governments. Such a rule would
constitute a direct order to the governments of the States, forcing them to assign their
own lawmaking power to a federally-chosen arm of their governments.

The U.S.

Supreme Court has rejected such federally-imposed allocations of state authority in a
number of contexts. And the only other court to consider this constitutional question
came to the same conclusion. See In re Vargas, 131 A.D.3d 4, 11-12 (N.Y. App. Div.
2015).
There being no legal obstacle, this Court should provide that otherwise-eligible
undocumented immigrants may be admitted to the Utah State Bar. Immigrants like the
petitioners are no different than any other barred attorney in Utah. They have lived in the
United States for decades, put down roots in Utah, obtained law degrees, and been
admitted to the bar of another State. There is no reason to deny them the ability to
3

practice their profession and support their families in their home State. The Court should
permit them to receive law licenses.
ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Can Enact a Law Making Undocumented Immigrants Eligible
for Bar Admission.
Under federal law, certain undocumented immigrants are, as a default matter, “not

eligible for any State or local public benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), which is defined to
include a “professional license,” id. § 1621(c). It is far from clear that law licenses fall
within § 1621(c)’s definition of public benefits. See In re Garcia, 58 Cal.4th 440, 456-57
(2014) (noting uncertainty). But even if they do, the same statute provides that “[a] State
may provide” that undocumented immigrants are eligible for “any State or local public
benefit . . . through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which
affirmatively provides for such eligibility.” Id. § 1621(d).
This Court can enact the law described in § 1621(d). The Utah Constitution gives
the Court exclusive authority to make laws governing bar admission for the State of Utah.
Section 1621(d) does not interfere with that decision, because its text and structure
impose no requirement about which branch of state government must speak for the State.
Nor is there any reliable legislative history that explains why Congress would have
wanted to dictate which branch exercises the State’s authority over public benefits. Any
such intrusion would require an unmistakably clear statement, which is nowhere to be
found in the text of § 1621(d). And in all events, constitutional avoidance precludes the

4

intrusive version, because a legislature-only rule would violate the States’ fundamental
prerogative to allocate authority within their own governments.
A. The Utah Constitution Gives This Court Sole Authority to Regulate Bar
Admission.
The Utah Constitution assigns this Court authority to regulate bar admission. See
Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4 (“The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law,
including admission to practice law . . . .”). This power is as old as the Court: “From its
beginning, this Court has had the inherent power to regulate the practice of law . . . .”
Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993). Indeed, throughout the
United States, “the courts have historically regulated admission to the practice of law
before them.” Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1066 (1991); see Hustedt
v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 30 Cal.3d 329, 336-37 (1981) (en banc) (the same is true
in “every state”).
The Court’s authority to decide who can be admitted to the Utah Bar is
“exclusive,” meaning it cannot be supplemented or displaced by the Legislature. Injured
Workers Ass’n of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶ 27, 374 P.3d 14 (“Our caselaw
recognizing this exclusive authority is extensive.”). The Utah Legislature used to have
concurrent authority to regulate bar admission, but in 1984, the people of Utah ratified a
constitutional amendment to remove that power from the Legislature. Id. ¶¶ 19, 25.
Vesting sole authority in this Court was “considered essential to . . . maintaining an
independent judiciary.” Id. ¶ 23 (quoting Const. Rev. Comm’n, Report to the Governor
and the 45th Legislature 27 (1984)). And to further ensure the Court’s independence, the
5

Constitution affirmatively forbids the other branches of Utah government from exercising
“any functions appertaining to” this Court, including bar admission. See Utah Const. art.
V, § 1; State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 25, 233 P.3d 476 (Utah 2010). Thus, without “any
exception,” the Utah Constitution does not permit “legislative oversight” of the Court’s
“authority to govern the practice of law.” Injured Workers, 2016 UT 21, ¶ 26 (quoting
Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 25).1
This Court has used its authority to issue a variety of rules to govern the practice
of law in Utah. See, e.g., Rule 14-704 (“Qualifications for Admission of Attorney
Applicants”); Rule 14-718 (“Licensing of Foreign Legal Consultants”).

The rule

requested by the petitioners would be precisely the type of law this Court regularly enacts
under its article XIII section 4 power.2
B. Section 1621(d) Does Not Restrict Who May Enact the Relevant State
Law.
1. Section 1621(d)’s Text Permits This Court to Extend Bar Admission to
Undocumented Immigrants.
Section 1621(d) allows this Court to exercise the authority conferred by the Utah
Constitution. The statute provides that “[a] State” can make immigrants eligible for
public benefits “through the enactment of a State law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). And the way
1

There is a Utah statute that regulates immigrants’ eligibility for public benefits in
general. See, e.g., Utah Code § 63G-12-401. But because the Utah Constitution prohibits
the Legislature from exercising this Court’s powers, that statute cannot be applied to bar
admission or otherwise constrain this Court’s discretion over who is admitted to the Utah
Bar.
2

If the Court determines that it cannot issue the requested rule, the Utah Legislature may
be able to enact such a law, because that function would no longer “appertain[] to” this
Court. Utah Const. art. V, § 1.
6

the State of Utah enacts laws governing bar admission—the only way—is through this
Court. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 580 (1984) (court acts as “the State itself”
when it regulates bar admission); see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360
(1977) (same). Indeed, because the Court exercises Utah’s lawmaking authority over the
practice of law, the Court “act[s] in a legislative capacity” when it regulates bar
admission.

Hoover, 466 U.S. at 580, 568.

And it “exercis[es] the State’s entire

legislative power with respect to regulating the Bar,” because its authority in this realm is
exclusive. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S.
719, 734 (1980) (emphasis added) (holding that state supreme court justices had
legislative immunity when making rules to govern the practice of law).
The United States may argue that § 1621(d) requires a statute enacted by a state
legislature, and thus prevents this Court from providing bar eligibility. But § 1621(d)
does not specify what form the “law” must take or who must “enact” it. Multiple aspects
of its text and context make clear that the law it describes can be enacted by whichever
branch of state government holds the relevant authority—not just the legislature.
First, the text’s “ordinary meaning” precludes a legislature-only construction.
State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ¶ 13, 308 P.3d 517 (quotation marks omitted); BP Am.
Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006) (instructing courts to start with a statute’s
“ordinary meaning”). Section 1621(d) uses the most general terms possible to describe
the process for a State to provide eligibility for benefits: “the enactment of a State law.”
8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). All dictionaries of which amici are aware agree that the term “law”
broadly refers to “[t]he set of rules or principles dealing with a specific area.” Black’s
7

Law Dictionary, 1015 (10th Ed. 2014). And “enact” simply means “[t]o make into law
by authoritative act.” Id. at 643.3 Thus, “Congress could not have chosen a more allencompassing phrase” to capture the range of laws that different state entities might
enact—statutes, regulations, court rules, executive orders. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
552 U.S. 214, 221 (2008). That choice makes sense, because States provide a wide set of
public benefits through a variety of entities.
Section 1621(d) also avoids any mention of who must “enact[]” the opt-out law. It
simply allows “the enactment” of such a law, “without respect to a specific actor.” Dean
v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009).

The text thus demonstrates a clear

“agnosticism about who does the” enacting. Id. (quotation marks omitted). To the extent
it specifies an actor, it simply refers to “[a] State” as its subject. And as explained above,
this Court acts as “the State itself” when it regulates bar admissions. Hoover, 466 U.S. at
580.
3

See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary, 643 (10th Ed. 2014) (defining “enactment” as “[t]he
action or process of making into law”); The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,
1544 (1993) (defining “law” as “a rule of conduct imposed by secular authority” or
“[a]ny of the body of individual rules in force in a State or community”); id. at 812
(defining “enact” as “establish (a law, legal penalty, etc.); decree (a thing, that)”); The
American Heritage College Dictionary, 769 (3d Ed. 1997) (defining “law” as “a rule of
conduct or procedure established by custom, agreement, or authority”); id. at 452
(defining “enact” as “to make into law”); Oxford Living Dictionary, “Law”, available at
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/law (defining a “law” as “[a]n individual rule
as
part
of
a
system of
law”);
id.
at
“Enact”,
available
at
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/enact (defining “enact” as “make . . . law”);
Merriam-Webster
Dictionary,
“Law”,
available
at
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/law (defining a “law” as “a rule of conduct or action” that is
“binding or enforced by a controlling authority”); id. at “Enact”, available at
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enact (defining “enact” as “to establish by
legal and authoritative act”).
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Section 1621(d)’s “agnosticism” about who enacts the relevant law is confirmed
by comparing it to other statutes where Congress did specify what kind of state law was
required to opt out of a default federal prohibition. For instance, “a State may enact a
statute” to cancel the default rule preempting certain securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 80a3a(c) (emphasis added). It can waive federal tax immunity through “a State statute” only.
5 U.S.C. § 5517(a)(1) (emphasis added). And “a State may enact legislation” to alter the
default distribution of certain federal funds. 31 U.S.C. § 6907(a) (emphasis added).4
These provisions show that Congress is “perfectly capable” of referring to state statutes
and legislation when it wants to. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
And it is similarly capable of naming specific state actors when it so intends. See, e.g.,
49 U.S.C. § 44718(d)(1) (“State aviation agency” can seek to opt out of federal
prohibition); 42 U.S.C. § 10706(a)(1) (“legislative body”); 42 U.S.C. § 1322
(“Governor”); 42 U.S.C. § 4021 (“insurance commissioner”). The fact that it did neither
in § 1621(d)—and instead used the most general terms available—forecloses any attempt
to read “law” in § 1621(d) to mean “statute.” See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S.
85, 103 (2007) (“Drawing meaning from silence is particularly inappropriate [where]
Congress has shown that it knows how to” convey that meaning “in express terms.”).
Congress did the same thing in the same bill that enacted § 1621, referring to a
“State statute” and a “State legislature” on multiple occasions.
4

See Personal

These provisions govern specific areas that are typically regulated by state
legislatures—taxes, appropriations—and therefore, unlike a reading of § 1621(d) that
bars this Court from granting the petition, do not necessarily shift any authority between
different branches of state government. Section 1621(d), by contrast, applies to a wide
array of benefits and licenses provided by a broad set of state entities.
9

Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”), Pub. L.
No. 104-193, §§ 104(k), 395(b)(2), 415(b)(3)(B), 901(a). In fact, PRWORA speaks
elsewhere of “laws enacted by the legislature of [a] State,” id. § 395(b)(2) (emphasis
added), a striking departure from § 1621(d)’s reference to laws enacted simply by “[a]
State.” Interpreting § 1621(d) to require legislation would effectively revise it to add the
exact phrase—“by the legislature”—that Congress included in other provisions but
omitted in § 1621(d).

“Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate

inclusion or exclusion” of statutory language. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983). The Court should not “conclud[e] here that the differing language in the two
subsections has the same meaning in each.” Id.; accord Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,
430-31 (2009).
Indeed, Congress itself regularly uses “law” to refer to legal rules beyond statutes.
Many statutes explicitly define “[t]he term ‘State law’ [to] include[] all laws, decisions,
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1);
see id. § 1191(d)(1) (same); 27 U.S.C. § 214(11) (similar); 15 U.S.C. § 6764(10)(A)
(similar). Other federal statutes make that definition clear in context, without defining
the term explicitly. See, e.g., 14 U.S.C. § 823a(a) (describing “provisions of law” as
“including” both “statutes and regulations”); 16 U.S.C. § 460l-33(c)(1)(B)(i) (referring to
“applicable laws (including any applicable statute, regulation, or Executive order)”); 18
U.S.C. § 3600A(d) (referring to “any statute, regulation, court order, or other provision of
law”).

These statutes rule out any suggestion that Congress automatically means

“statute” when it says “law.” Just the opposite.
10

Reading § 1621(d) to require legislative action would likewise run contrary to
widespread judicial usage. Courts often describe legal rules as being “enacted by [a]
Court.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 862 (1994); see, e.g., Pyper v. Bond, 2011 UT
45, ¶ 14 n.9, 258 P.3d 575 (“[T]he Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted by this
court . . . .”). And they frequently describe court-enacted legal rules as “laws.” For
instance, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are enacted by U.S. Supreme Court, which
describes them as “federal law” and “the law of the United States.” Société Nationale
Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 533 (1987). Utah courts
characterize them the same way, as “federal law.” Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,
2003 UT App. 46, ¶ 9 n.11, 68 P.3d 1008; see also Brickyard Homeowners’ Ass’n v.
Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah 1983).
In addition to clashing with dictionary definitions, statutory usage, and judicial
usage, a statute-only reading would not square with “the language as we normally speak
it.” Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 79 (2007). If a lawyer misappropriates client
funds, thereby triggering severe penalties, no one would dispute that the person has
violated state law. See Utah R. Prof’l Conduct 1.15(a) (requiring attorneys to safeguard
client funds); Sup. Ct. R. Prof’l Prac. 14-603 (listing permissible sanctions); In re
Discipline of Lundgren, 2015 UT 58, ¶ 25, 355 P.3d 984 (affirming disbarment). Nor
could anyone dispute that this Court had enacted those laws. And while “enact” and
“law” may be most frequently used in the context of legislation, they are plainly not
limited to that context. As this Court has explained, “the typical reach of [a] statute” does
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not “define the full breadth of the statute’s scope.” Graves v. North Eastern Serv., Inc.,
2015 UT 28, ¶ 65, 345 P.3d 619.
It is therefore clear that § 1621(d) does not dictate which branch of Utah’s
government must exercise the State’s authority to provide public benefits. Congress
chose the most general terms available for describing a legal rule and the process for
establishing it. There is no broader phrase it could have used to capture the range of
benefits that States provide and the range of state actors who provide them. If Congress
had wanted to require a statute enacted by a state legislature, all it had to do was use the
word “statute” or “legislature,” as it has in many other statutes.
There is accordingly no basis to read § 1621(d) to require a statute enacted by the
state legislature. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished courts not to
“read[] words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.” Dean, 556 U.S. at
572 (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997)). The text alone answers this
Court’s first question.
2. The Federalism Clear-Statement Rule Confirms that This Court May Enact
the Requested Law.
Even assuming arguendo that § 1621(d) was open to multiple interpretations,
principles of federalism require courts to interpret federal statutes in a way that preserves
the States’ internal distribution of power. For a federal statute to alter “the structure of [a
State’s] government,” Congress “must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute.” Gregory 501 U.S. at 460. (quotation marks omitted). This
clear-statement rule applies regardless of whether the more intrusive interpretation would
12

violate the Constitution.5 And it forecloses a legislature-only view of § 1621(d), because
that interpretation is not “unmistakably clear” from the text of the statute.
The federalism clear-statement rule applies here because the intrusive reading of
§ 1621(d) would “alter[] the State’s governmental structure” by shifting power over bar
admission from state courts to state legislatures. City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49, 52
(D.C. Cir. 1999); see Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (applying the
rule because an interpretation would have altered the “State’s chosen disposition of its
own power” by shifting power from state legislatures to political subdivisions). And the
rule applies with particular force because “the regulation of the activities of the bar is at
the core of the State’s power.” Bates, 433 U.S. at 361; Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442
(1979); see Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying Gregory
to federal laws that affect the practice of law).
Section 1621(d) cannot satisfy the rule’s high bar, because its text does not
“plainly and unequivocally” state that only a legislature can enact the relevant law.
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467. As explained, it makes no mention of legislatures or statutes,
and it uses the broadest and most general language to describe the process for providing
benefits. The federalism rule is therefore dispositive here.
In fact, § 1621(d) is even less explicit than many of the provisions that have failed
to satisfy the rule. In Nixon, for instance, a federal statute provided that States could not
restrict “any entity” from entering the telecommunications business, 47 U.S.C. § 253(a)
5

See City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying the federalism
clear-statement rule while “assum[ing] arguendo that Congress” could enact the intrusive
version); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943) (same).
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(emphasis added)—language that would naturally include municipal entities, thus
limiting States’ power over their subdivisions. The Supreme Court still rejected that
interpretation, because the statute’s text was “not limited to one reading” and did not
“unequivocally” state that it applied to municipalities. Nixon, 541 U.S. at 141.6
Even more striking, the Election Clause states that certain election rules “shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”

U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1

(emphasis added). Despite that language, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the
Clause to allow lawmaking by whichever branch States choose to empower—not just the
legislature—because federalism requires “that States retain autonomy to establish their
own governmental processes.” Az. State Legislature v. Az. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015) (holding that a State could empower an independent
commission to regulate elections). If the Constitution cannot impose a legislature-only
rule explicitly, clearly a statute cannot do so implicitly, without any mention of the
legislature.

6

Where the federalism clear-statement rule applies, it is typically “fatal” to an intrusive
construction of a statute. Nixon, 541 U.S. at 141. Numerous cases demonstrate “the
Supreme Court’s strong fidelity to the ‘federalism canon.’” Ho v. ReconTrust Co., NA,
840 F.3d 618, 625 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended, 858 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2017); see Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (collecting cases). Indeed, the one
case where this Court has found that a statute satisfied the rule involved a statute that was
completely “explicit” about its intent to regulate real estate transactions—no other
construction was possible. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Sundquist, 2018 UT 58, ¶ 9, 430 P.3d
623. And the intrusion there was simply that Congress had regulated interstate commerce
in an area that States traditionally regulate, not the significantly rarer and more invasive
step of reordering the States’ internal structure of authority.
14

3. Nothing in the Legislative History Overrides the Plain Meaning of the
Statute’s Text.
Because the statutory text is clear, this Court need not “resort to legislative
history.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994); see World Peace Mvmt.
of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994) (same).
To the extent legislative history is relevant, it confirms that § 1621(d)’s purpose is
to let States provide benefits if they choose to. Congress recognized that certain benefits
would help immigrants achieve PRWORA’s goal of “self-sufficiency,” H.R. Rep. No.
104-651 (“House Report”), 1996 WL 393655, at *1240 (June 27, 1996); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1601(1), (3), and so it created a mechanism for States to provide those benefits. See
House Report, 1996 WL 393655, at *1445; Finch v. Comm. Health Ins. Connector Auth.,
459 Mass. 655, 673 n.18 (2011) (“Congress is pleased for States” to provide benefits
where they choose to). The intrusive reading of § 1621(d) conflicts with that purpose,
because it would prevent States from providing eligibility using their own lawmaking
processes. Nothing in § 1621(d)’s legislative history hints at why Congress would have
wanted to punish States for having the wrong internal distribution of power.
A single, unexplained sentence in the legislative history suggests otherwise, but it
is plainly not a reliable guide for interpreting § 1621(d). It states that § 1621(d) requires
“the affirmative enactment of a law [1] by a State legislature [2] and signed by the
Governor . . . [3] that references this provision.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383
(July 30, 1996). This describes what the text of § 1621(d) requires—“the affirmative
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enactment of a law”—but then adds three additional requirements that are not in the
enacted text.
This errant sentence cannot be used to interpret § 1621(d). The U.S. Supreme
Court has instructed courts only to consult pieces of legislative history that “shed a
reliable light” on the meaning of statutory text. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (emphasis added) (refusing to rely on unreliable
legislative history); Matter of the Adoption of B.N.A., 2018 UT App. 224, ¶ 19 n.6
(same). But a patently inaccurate description of a statute cannot be a reliable indicator of
its meaning. The sentence above is inaccurate in multiple respects, because the text of
§ 1621(d) makes no mention of governors, legislatures, or references to the statute.7
Courts typically do not give weight to such a “snippet of legislative history” that is not
“anchored in the text of the statute.” Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994).
For that reason, the California Supreme Court concluded that the same sentence
was unreliable and therefore irrelevant to § 1621(d)’s meaning. See Martinez v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 50 Cal.4th 1277, 1293, 1295-96 (Cal. 2010) (“The committee report may
not create a requirement not found in section 1621 itself.”).

This Court, too, has

disregarded legislative history that describes a narrower rule than the enacted text. See
Graves v. N.E. Servs., 2015 UT 28, ¶¶ 61, 67, 345 P.3d 619 (refusing to interpret a broad

7

Giving weight to this isolated sentence would narrow § 1621(d) in multiple untenable
ways that have no basis in its text. It would require benefits laws to explicitly cite
§ 1621(d)—the result rejected in Martinez. And it would mean that even a state statute
could not provide eligibility if the governor allowed it to become law without her
signature, or if the legislature overrode her veto. See Utah Const. art. VII, § 8.
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statutory term (“fault”) to have the narrower meaning (“negligence”) stated in the
legislative history).
The sentence’s reliability is further eroded by other inaccuracies in the same
committee report.

The very next paragraph describes a provision that regulates

“information regarding . . . citizenship and immigration status” only. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).
But the committee report says the statute applies to “information regarding the
immigration status of an alien or the presence, whereabouts, or activities of illegal
aliens.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 (emphasis added). Courts have uniformly
rejected those additional elements, because they clearly go beyond the enacted text of
§ 1373. See, e.g., Steinle v. San Francisco, --- F.3d ---, 2019 WL 1323172, *6 (9th Cir.
Mar. 25, 2019); United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1101-03 (E.D. Cal.
2018); Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 331-33 (E.D. Pa. 2018); San
Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 967-68 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The committee
report’s unusual descriptions of § 1373 and § 1621(d) are either simply errors or, more
troublingly, the kind of “strategic manipulations” that trigger “the worst fears of critics
who argue legislative history will be used to circumvent the Article I process.”
Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 568, 570.
Finally, regardless of the sentence’s reliability, the federalism and constitutional
avoidance principles discussed above and below trump any contrary legislative history.
See supra Part I.B.2; infra Part I.C. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, when an
interpretation would raise “grave doubts” about a federal statute’s constitutionality,
courts must choose a construction that avoids those doubts even if “the legislative history
17

point[s] somewhat more strongly in another way.” Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corp.,
419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974); see also Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147-48 (explaining that a
substantive canon trumped “contrary indications in the statute’s legislative history”). In
other words, legislative history should not be used to alter the federal-state balance or
create constitutional problems where the text of the statute does not.
4. Case Law Provides No Basis to Disregard § 1621(d)’s Plain Meaning.
Few courts have addressed whether § 1621(d) requires a statute. The New York
Appellate Division and Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded it did not, and that state
courts can therefore make undocumented immigrants eligible for bar admission. See In
re Vargas, 131 A.D.3d 4, 11-12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); In re Order Amending Rule 202,
No. 790 (Pa. 2019).8

Other courts have mostly addressed whether already-enacted

statutes satisfied § 1621(d)’s other requirements, like the need to “affirmatively” provide
eligibility. See, e.g., De Vries v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 6 Cal. App. 5th 574, 595 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2016). Because state statutes already existed in those cases, the courts had no
occasion to consider whether other entities could make the relevant law. At most, these
cases assumed that a statute was required, but none of them analyzed the issue, much less
announced any holding.
Only one court has concluded that § 1621(d) may require a statute enacted by a
legislature. See Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners re Questions as to Whether Undocumented
Immigrants Are Eligible for Admission to the Fla. Bar, 134 So.3d 432 (Fla. 2014)
8

Available at https://bit.ly/2U67QMN. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted this
rule at the recommendation of the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners. See 48 Pa.
Bull. 6385, Vol. 48, No. 40 (Oct. 6, 2018), https://bit.ly/2HUdCdB.
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(holding that DACA recipients were not eligible for law licenses in Florida). But even
there, it was not clear that the Florida Supreme Court reached a final conclusion. After
stating why a statute might be necessary, the court noted the petitioners’ argument that
“non-legislative forms of ‘State law’” could also suffice. Id. at 435. The court did not
reject that possibility, it simply did not find any “existing” law in Florida providing
benefits, id.—hardly a reason for why a court could not enact such a law.
In any event, the Florida Supreme Court’s discussion of § 1621(d) omitted almost
all of the relevant analysis.

The court did not examine the text of § 1621(d) at all—it

simply asserted, without analysis, that the “plain language” requires a statute. Id. at 435.
It did not consider the meaning of “enact” or “law,” consult any dictionaries, compare the
language to other federal statutes, examine judicial usage, consider the federalism clearstatement rule, or address the constitutional problems with a legislature-only rule. Id. at
435 & n.5. The court’s incomplete analysis provides little guidance on this question.
C. Interpreting § 1621(d) to Require State Legislation Would Raise Serious
Constitutional Concerns.
Constitutional concerns present yet another reason to avoid the intrusive reading
of § 1621(d).

“[W]hen an Act of Congress raises a serious doubt as to its

constitutionality,” courts must “first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
689 (2001) (quotation marks omitted); see Cole v. Jordan School Dist., 899 P.2d 776,
778 (Utah 1995). To avoid such doubts, “every reasonable construction must be resorted
to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
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Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (quotation
marks omitted); see Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24, ¶ 23, 332 P.3d 900.
1. Section 1621(d) would raise grave constitutional doubts if it dictated who must
exercise the States’ lawmaking authority.

Congress cannot issue commands to the

governments of the States, including commands about how to allocate their authority. It
can only regulate private actors directly—something a legislature-only rule would not do.
Section 1621(d) therefore cannot require Utah to exercise its public-benefits authority
through a federally-chosen branch of its government. Accord Vargas, 131 A.D.3d at 1112 (rejecting statute-only interpretation on constitutional grounds); id. at 9 n.9 (noting
that other courts have not addressed this constitutional question).
The Constitution reflects a “fundamental structural decision” to give Congress
“the power to regulate individuals, not States.” Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 147576 (2018) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)). Congress can
therefore “exercise its legislative authority directly over [private] individuals,” but it can
never “issue direct orders to the governments of the States.” Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476
(quotation marks omitted). This prohibition on direct orders applies “categorically.”
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997). Indeed, “even a particularly strong
federal interest” would not allow Congress to dictate how States exercise their lawmaking
authority. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 178).
This rule prohibits direct orders of all kinds.

Congress cannot order state

governments to enact a law, see New York, 505 U.S. at 174-80, or refrain from enacting a
law, see Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478, or accept federal funds, see NFIB v. Sebelius, 567
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U.S. 519, 587 (2012), or administer a federal program, see Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-33.
Nor can Congress dictate where a State chooses to locate its capitol, because that is “a
matter pertaining purely to the internal policy of the state.” Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559,
565, 579 (1911); see also Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 260
(2011) (recognizing “limits on the Federal Government’s power to affect the internal
operations of a State”).
Likewise, Congress cannot “displace a State’s allocation of governmental power
and responsibility” between the branches of its government. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 752 (1999). This, too, is a purely internal matter, and one that is fundamental to a
State’s sovereignty. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (A “State defines itself as a sovereign”
through “the structure of its government.”). Thus, in its sovereign immunity cases, the
U.S. Supreme Court has explained that subjecting an unwilling State to lawsuits would
shift spending decisions from the State’s political branches to its courts—something the
Constitution’s federal structure forbids. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 751-52. In other words,
because “[a] State is entitled to order the processes of its own governance” free from
federal interference, Congress cannot alter a State’s decision to “assign[]” a particular
policy decision “to the political branches, rather than the courts.” Id.; see also Stewart,
563 U.S. at 265 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (doubting that Congress could demand “farreaching changes with respect to [a State’s] governmental structure” even as a condition
of federal funds).9

9

These principles are not limited to the sovereign immunity context, but rather “inhere[]
in the system of federalism established by the Constitution.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 730.
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The same is true here. If Congress cannot restructure state governments indirectly,
by abrogating sovereign immunity, surely it cannot restructure them directly, by spelling
out exactly which branch must regulate a given area. The Constitution simply does not
allow that kind of “federally-imposed restructuring of power within state government.”
City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 870 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (striking down
federal statute); see also Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[S]tate
sovereignty . . . surely encompasses the right to set the duties of office for state-created
officials.”).
The U.S. Supreme Court has protected the States’ fundamental prerogative to
structure their governments in a variety of contexts. For instance, as mentioned above,
the Election Clause states that certain election laws “shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Court has nonetheless held
that States can choose which state entity should exercise that power.

Az. State

Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2673. As the Court explained, “it is characteristic of our federal
system that States retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes,”
including which “component of state government [is] authorized to prescribe regulations”
on a given subject. Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Indeed, the principles that protect state sovereign immunity often also protect state
autonomy more broadly. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-61 (holding that federalism
clear-statement rule applies to both Tenth and Eleventh Amendments); Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (same). And as explained in the text, courts
have protected States’ prerogative to structure their own governments in multiple
contexts, including sovereign immunity, the Elections Clause, and the anticommandeering doctrine.
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Thus, Murphy, Alden, Arizona Redistricting Commission, and their antecedents
add up to the same core principle:

Congress cannot issue direct orders to state

governments, including orders dictating which branch of government must exercise a
particular piece of the State’s lawmaking authority.

That principle forecloses any

interpretation of § 1621(d) that would require state legislatures to exercise States’
authority over public benefits. “A more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to
imagine.” Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478.
2.

In other litigation after Murphy, the United States has advanced several

arguments to salvage other statutes that “issue direct orders to the governments of the
States.” Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476; see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a), (b) (ordering States
not to enact certain laws). Every court to consider these arguments has rejected them.
See San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 949-953; Philadelphia, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 329-30;
Chicago, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 868-73. This Court should too.
First, the United States may argue that a legislature-only rule would be a “valid
preemption provision,” because the federal benefits scheme regulates private actors.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479. That is wrong. As explained above, Congress can regulate
private actors directly, but not state governments. Thus, to be valid, every rule Congress
enacts must “operate[]” as one that “imposes restrictions or confers rights on private
actors.” Id. at 1480; see id. at 1480-81 (giving examples). Even if that description
applied to § 1621’s underlying eligibility rules, it plainly would not apply to a command
that States exercise their public-benefits authority through their legislatures. That rule
would not confer any right or impose any restriction on private actors—it would simply
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govern how state governments make their own regulatory decisions. In short, “there is
simply no way to understand” such a rule “as anything other than a direct command to
the States.” Id. at 1481.10
In other cases, the United States has argued that direct orders to the States are
permissible as long as they are connected to a broader federal scheme like the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).

But there is no such exception to the

Constitution’s “fundamental structural decision . . . to withhold from Congress the power
to issue orders directly to the States.” Id. at 1475. Multiple cases make this clear. In
Printz, the broader federal Brady Act scheme regulated private parties’ handgun
purchases, 521 U.S. at 902-03, but the Supreme Court still invalidated the specific rule
that dictated how state officers had to participate in that scheme. The same was true in
NFIB, where Congress had enacted an extensive federal scheme regulating private health
insurance, but the Court struck down the specific rule that constituted a direct order to the
States. The “same principles” applied in Murphy and apply here. 138 S. Ct. at 1477; see
also Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 644 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying anticommandeering principles in the immigration context).
10

That kind of direct order goes far beyond the rules in Gregory and Nixon, which the
Court assumed Congress could have imposed with an explicit statement. In those cases,
the intrusive version of the rule would have applied across the board, to state actors and
private actors alike. The Constitution allows those kinds of generally-applicable laws.
See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479 (anti-commandeering does not prevent federal laws that
“appl[y] equally to state and private actors”); see, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Congress may apply FLSA to state employees).
Here, by contrast, a legislature-only rule would target the States alone. See Printz, 521
U.S. at 932 n.17 (striking down a statute whose “extension . . . to private citizens” would
be “impossible”).
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Second, the United States may argue that Congress can order the States to provide
public benefits through their legislatures because Congress could have instead preempted
States from providing those benefits. But the fact that Congress did not preempt certain
state laws does not give Congress the power to dictate which state entity enacts them.
Notably, when Murphy listed the ways that Congress can validly influence state
policymaking, it did not mention any congressional power to force States to enact laws a
certain way simply because Congress chose not to preempt those laws. 138 S. Ct. at
1478-79.
Such a power would have remarkable consequences, because it would mean
Congress could forcibly alter the internal operations of state governments in any realm
where a federal regulatory scheme exists. Congress could require States to enact certain
healthcare laws by initiative only, because Congress could have preempted those laws
instead. See 42 U.S.C. ch. 157 (federal healthcare laws). Or Congress could require
legislative supermajorities for state laws that affect greenhouse gas emissions. See 42
U.S.C. ch. 134 (federal energy laws). Or it could require that governors, not state
administrative agencies, issue licenses for businesses engaged in interstate commerce.
See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1) (preempting certain state regulations of interstate
commerce). The United States’ theory would mark a vast expansion of congressional
power over state governments.
The United States has elsewhere tried to bolster this argument by suggesting that
ambiguous language in FERC v. Mississippi establishes that Congress can issue
commands in any “field” that is “pre-emptible.” 456 U.S. 742, 769 (1982). It is unclear
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what the government’s suggested rule would actually mean, because by definition, every
“field” in which Congress can legislate is “pre-emptible.” See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8
(legislative power); id. art. VI, § 2 (preemption). In any event, the U.S. Supreme Court
has already rejected any such reading. In New York, the Court struck down a federal
command in the field of radioactive waste, even though “Congress could, if it wished,
pre-empt state radioactive waste regulation” altogether. 505 U.S. at 160. The Court
rejected Justice White’s attempt to read FERC broadly, id. at 204, explaining that “even
where Congress has the authority” to preempt state law, “it lacks the power directly to
compel the States” to regulate according to federal instructions, id. at 166. And in
Murphy, the Court counseled against reading FERC beyond its facts. It explained that the
statute in FERC was constitutional because it merely asked States “to consider
Congress’s preference,” and it emphasized that “FERC was decided well before our
decisions in New York and Printz.” 138 S. Ct. at 1479 (emphasis added).11

11

The Supreme Court’s decision in Hodel is inapposite for the same reason. There,
“Congress enacted a statute that comprehensively regulated surface coal mining and
offered States” the option of enforcing the federal regime. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479.
Here, in contrast, a statute-only rule would dictate how States exercise their own
authority to provide benefits using their own funds. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (regulating
“State and local public benefits” only); id. § 1621(c) (defining benefits as those provided
“by appropriated funds of a State”). Unlike in Hodel, § 1621(d) does not regulate States’
participation in the federal benefits scheme—a different statute governs those. See 8
U.S.C. § 1611 (regulating benefits provided “by appropriated funds of the United States,”
many of which are disbursed by the States).
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II.

Qualified Bar Applicants Should Be Eligible to Practice Law Regardless of
Immigration Status.
The Court should enact the law described in § 1621(d) and provide that

immigrants are eligible for law licenses if they meet the normal criteria for bar admission.
As many States have concluded, there is no “rational basis for withholding the privilege
of practicing law” from immigrants like the petitioners in this case. Vargas, 131 A.D.3d
at 12, 27-28; see also Pet. Br. 7-12 (describing such laws enacted by courts and
legislatures in New York, Pennsylvania, California, Florida, Illinois Nebraska, Wyoming,
and New Jersey).

The Utah State Bar has come to the same conclusion, and has

petitioned this Court to enact the same rule.

See In re Utah State Bar, Case No.

20160318-SC. It would be appropriate for this Court to do so for at least five reasons.
First, in every relevant way, the petitioners are in the same position as other
applicants who successfully apply for admission to the Utah State Bar. They have lived
virtually their entire lives in the United States, they have excelled in law school and
received law degrees, they are already members in good standing of another State’s bar,
and they have been working productively as lawyers for multiple years. The petitioners
are no different from any other successful bar applicant in Utah. Their applications
should be decided based on their qualifications to practice law, not their immigration
status.
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Second, the petitioners’ immigration status does not reflect negatively on their
moral character. Just like U.S.-born children, they know no other country as their home.
They have built deeply rooted and productive lives here, and their families, communities,
and careers are in Utah. They have committed no crime in doing so, because “it is not a
crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States.” Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012). And in any event, past violations of the law typically
do not result in any categorical prohibition against bar admission, especially when an
applicant’s subsequent achievements demonstrate good moral character.

See, e.g.,

Garcia, 58 Cal.4th at 460 (explaining that the “bare fact” of an illegal act does not
prevent bar admission) (quotation marks omitted).
Third, the United States itself has determined that the petitioners should be able to
live and work in the United States. The petitioners have been granted protection under
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which required them to
show that they had a clean record and were pursuing their education diligently. The
program is premised on the federal government’s belief that “the United States’
immigration laws were not designed ‘to remove productive young people to countries
where they may not have lived or even speak the language.’” Vargas, 131 A.D.3d at 15
(quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, at 2 (June 15,
2012)).
Fourth, the petitioners are equipped to put their Utah law licenses to good use. As
DACA recipients, they have received authorization from the federal government to seek
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employment in Utah and anywhere else in the United States.12

See 8 C.F.R.

§ 274a.12(c)(14). They would accordingly have the same options to practice law as any
other barred attorney in Utah.
There is no reason, however, to limit the eligibility rule to DACA recipients,
because even without DACA protections, an undocumented immigrant can still put a law
license to productive use in multiple ways. First, there are numerous other ways to obtain
employment authorization, such as when asylum or other proceedings are pending. See 8
C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(10)-(13); id. § 274a.12(c)(8)-(11), (14), (18)-(20), (22), (24).
Second, there are many ways a person without employment authorization can
productively use a law license.

For instance, an attorney without employment

authorization can “provide[] legal services on a pro bono basis or outside the United
States.” Garcia, 58 Cal.4th at 462 (noting the United States’ agreement). That is why
Utah law allows foreign law students to obtain law licenses despite their lack of
employment authorization in the United States. See Utah Court Admission Rule 1412

DACA has been in effect continuously since 2012. In November 2017, DHS issued a
memorandum stating its intention to gradually rescind the program. But multiple courts
have enjoined the rescission nationwide, holding that DHS’s rescission decision was
legally and procedurally improper. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 279 F. Supp.
3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018); NAACP v. Trump, 315 F.
Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y.
2018). The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether to grant review. See Robert
Barnes, DACA Program Not Likely to Get Supreme Court Review This Term, Wash. Post
(Jan. 22, 2019). At the same time, Congress is considering bills that would grant DACA
recipients permanent legal status. See Nicole Acevedo, House Democrats Introduce Bill
to Give Citizenship to DACA and TPS Recipients, NBC News (Mar. 12, 2019). For
present purposes, all that matters is that the Petitioners currently have both DACA
protection and employment authorization. The Court need not make any predictions
about how other litigation and legislation may change things in the future.
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704(d). Undocumented immigrants can also work as independent contractors without
violating the federal prohibition on unauthorized “employment.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a; see 8
C.F.R. § 274a.1(f)-(h) (prohibition does not reach “independent contractors”).
Immigrants without DACA protection or employment authorization are thus perfectly
capable of using law licenses productively. See Garcia, 58 Cal.4th at 463 n.18 (granting
bar admission to undocumented immigrant who had not received DACA relief or
employment authorization).13
Fifth, admitting the petitioners to the Utah Bar would serve the important goal of
allowing immigrants to be self-sufficient and serve their communities. In the same
statutory scheme as § 1621(d), Congress declared that our “national policy” is to
encourage immigrants to achieve “[s]elf-sufficiency” and “rely on their own capabilities”
rather than public assistance. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1), (2)(A). The Petitioners are seeking
precisely that, and are asking this Court for permission to support themselves and their
families through their own work.

There is no reason to prevent otherwise-eligible

immigrants from being admitted to the Utah Bar.
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the petition and provide that undocumented immigrants
may be admitted to the bar if they otherwise meet the standards for admission.

13

See also Br. of Am. Civil Liberties Union et al., In re Garcia, No. S202512, at 18-25
(Cal. filed July 27, 2012) (explaining ways a person without employment authorization
can still work as a lawyer), https://bit.ly/2UYUnn2.
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